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A STUDY OF TRUTH PREDICATES IN MATRIX SEMANTICS
TOMMASO MORASCHINI
Abstract. Abstract algebraic logic is a theory that provides general tools
for the algebraic study of arbitrary propositional logics. According to
this theory, every logic L is associated with a matrix semantics Mod∗L.
This paper is a contribution to the systematic study of the so-called
truth sets of the matrices in Mod∗L. In particular, we show that the
fact that the truth sets of Mod∗L can be defined by means of equations
with universally quantified parameters is captured by an order-theoretic
property of the Leibniz operator restricted to deductive filters of L.
This result was previously known for equational definability without
parameters. Similarly, it was known that the truth sets of Mod∗L are
implicitly definable if and only if the Leibniz operator is injective on
deductive filters of L over every algebra. However, it was an open
problem whether the injectivity of the Leibniz operator transfers from the
theories of L to its deductive filters over arbitrary algebras. We show that
this is the case for logics expressed in a countable language, and that it
need not be true in general. Finally we consider an intermediate condition
on the truth sets in Mod∗L that corresponds to the order-reflection of the
Leibniz operator.
1. Introduction
Abstract algebraic logic (AAL for short) is a theory that aims to provide
general tools for the algebraic study of arbitrary propositional logics [3,
4, 10, 16, 18, 19]. According to this theory, every (propositional) logic L
is associated with a matrix semantics Mod∗L with respect to which L is
sound and complete. In the best-known cases the class of matrices Mod∗L
coincides with the intended algebraic semantics of L, e.g., in the case of
superintuitionistic logics Mod∗L is the class of matrices based on a variety
of Heyting algebras with the top element as designated element.
It is well known that a logical matrix 〈A, F〉 can be regarded as a first-
order structure, namely, as an algebra equipped with the interpretation of
a predicate symbol P(x). The intuitive reading of logical matrices suggests
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2 TOMMASO MORASCHINI
that the set of designated elements F represents truth inside the set of
truth-values A. Accordingly P(x) can be understood as a truth predicate
and F as the truth set of 〈A, F〉. Keeping this in mind, it makes sense to
refer to the truth sets of a class of matrices.
One of the most striking achievements in the field of AAL is the dis-
covery of the importance of the so-called Leibniz operator. This is the map
ΩA : P(A)→ ConA, defined for every algebra A, that sends every subset
F ⊆ A to the largest congruence θ of A such that F is a union of blocks
of θ. The importance of the Leibniz operator comes from the fact that its
behaviour on the deductive filters of a given logic L determines interesting
facts about the definability of logical equivalence and of the truth sets of
the matrix semantics Mod∗L. This discovery led to the development of
the so-called Leibniz hierarchy [10, 16, 27, 33], where logics are classified
according to definability properties related to the behaviour of the Leibniz
operator. Then the goal of this paper is to contribute to the systematic study
of the aspects Leibniz hierarchy related to the definability of the truth sets
of the matrix semantics Mod∗L. This program has already been considered
in the AAL literature, especially in [6, 12, 24, 32].
The starting point of our discussion is the following definability condi-
tion: we say that truth is almost parametrically equationally definable in Mod∗L
if there is a set of equations τ (x,~y) such that the non-empty truth sets in
Mod∗L are exactly the sets of solutions of the equations τ (x,~y) once we
bound the parameters ~y by a universal quantifier. Similarly, we say that
truth is equationally definable in Mod∗L when there is a set of equations
τ (x) such that the truth sets in Mod∗L are exactly the sets of solutions of
the equations τ (x). It is clear that equational definability implies almost
parametrized equational definability, and we show that the converse does
not hold in general. The reader may wonder why we restrict the defini-
tion of almost parametrized equational definability to non-empty truth
sets. This is because we prove that, when applied to all (possibly empty)
truth sets of Mod∗L, the notion of equational and parametrized equational
definability coincide. In particular, this implies that these two definability
conditions are equivalent for logics with at least one tautology (Corollary
3.10).
Logics whose truth sets are equationally or almost parametrically equa-
tionally definable can be characterized by means of the behaviour of the
Leibniz operator. More precisely, it turns out that truth is equationally
(resp. almost parametrically equationally) definable in Mod∗L if and only if
the Leibniz operator is completely order-reflecting on (resp. on non-empty)
deductive filters of L over every algebra. This condition on the Leibniz
operator can be equivalently restricted to the theories of the logic L, i.e.
to the filters of L over the countably generated term algebra (Theorems
3.9 and 3.5). These results were first discovered by Raftery for equational
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definability in [32], where parametrized equational definability is not taken
into account.
Until now we focused on logics whose truth sets can be defined by
means of some linguistic translation of formulas into equations. This idea
presents some analogy with the one of explicit definability in first-order logic,
in the sense that it requires that the definition of the truth sets is witnessed
by some linguistic construction, i.e., by sets of equations. Now, Beth’s
definability theorem states that in first-order logic explicit definability
and implicit definability coincide. Building on this analogy, it is natural
to consider some suitable version of the notion of implicit definability in
the framework of truth sets of matrix semantics and to ask under which
conditions these two kinds of definability coincide. Accordingly, given a
logic L, we say that truth is implicitly definable in Mod∗L if the matrices
in Mod∗L are determined by their algebraic reduct. The analogy with
Beth’s definability theorem culminated in the discovery [12, 24, 26, 32] that
the notions of implicit and equational definability coincide when L is a
protoalgebraic logic (Theorem 5.3).
Now, implicit definability can be characterized in terms of the behaviour
of the Leibniz operator. More precisely, it has long been known that truth is
implicitly definable in Mod∗L if and only if the Leibniz operator is injective
on the deductive filters of L over every algebra (Lemma 5.2). This fact posed
the problem of whether the injectivity of the Leibniz operator transfers from
the theories of a logic to its filters over arbitrary algebras [32, Problem 1].
The feeling that this question could have a positive answer was motivated
by the fact that the main conditions on the Leibniz operator considered
in the literature transfer from theories to filters over arbitrary algebras. In
fact Czelakowski and Jansana provided in [12] a positive answer to this
problem, under the assumption of protoalgebraicity (Theorem 5.4). We
solve this problem by showing that its answer depends on the cardinality
of the language in which the logic is formulated. More precisely, if the
language is countable, then the injectivity of the Leibniz operator transfers
from theories to arbitrary filters (Theorem 5.6). On the other hand, we
show that it is possible to construct counterexamples for logics expressed
in uncountable languages (Section 6).
An intermediate definability condition that we take into account is the
following: we say that truth is small in Mod∗L when the truth sets in
this class are the smallest deductive filters of the logic L. We prove that
this condition is equivalent to the fact that the Leibniz operator is order-
reflecting over deductive filters of every algebra (Lemma 7.3). As it was
the case for injectivity, the order-reflection of the Leibniz operator transfers
from theories to filters over arbitrary algebras for logics expressed in a
countable language (Theorem 7.4), while there are counterexamples among
logics whose language is uncountable. The work described until now
originates an expansion of the Leibniz hierarchy with additional, weaker
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classes of logics corresponding to the definability conditions on the truth
sets considered here. The expanded hierarchy is depicted in Figure 1.
2. Matrix semantics
Here we present a brief survey of the main concepts of abstract algebraic
logic we will make use of along the article; a systematic exposition can be
found for example in [3, 4, 5, 10, 16, 18, 19]. Fixed an algebraic type L and
a countable set Var of variables x, y, z, etc., we denote Fm the set of formulas
over L built up with the variables Var and by Fm the corresponding
absolutely free algebra. Moreover, given a formula ϕ ∈ Fm, we write
ϕ(x,~z) if the variables of ϕ are among x and ~z and x does not appear in
~z. Keeping this in mind that, formally speaking, equations are pairs of
formulas, we set Eq := Fm× Fm. From now on we assume that we are
working with a fixed algebraic type.
By a logic L we understand a closure operator CL : P(Fm) → P(Fm)
which is structural in the sense that σCL ⊆ CLσ for every endomorphism (or,
equivalently, substitution) σ : Fm→ Fm. Given Γ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm sometimes
we write Γ L` ϕ instead of ϕ ∈ CL(Γ). Moreover, given Γ ∪ {ϕ,ψ} ⊆ Fm,
we denote by Γ, ϕ a`L ψ, Γ the fact that both Γ, ϕ `L ψ and Γ,ψ `L ϕ
are true. A formula ϕ is a theorem of L if ∅ `L ϕ. A logic L is purely
inferential if it has no theorems. Given two logics L and L′, we write L 6 L′
if CL(Γ) ⊆ CL′(Γ) for every Γ ⊆ Fm. Since L always denotes an arbitrary
logic, we skip, in the formulation of our results, assumptions like “let L be
a logic”.
We denote algebras with bold capital lettersA, B, C, etc. (with universes
A, B, C, etc. respectively). The trivial algebra is denoted by 1. Given a logic
L and an algebra A, we say that a set F ⊆ A is a deductive filter of L over A
when
if Γ L` ϕ, then for every homomorphism h : Fm→ A,
if h[Γ] ⊆ F, then h(ϕ) ∈ F
for every Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm. We denote by FiLA the set of deductive filters of
L over A, which turns out to be a closure system and, therefore, a complete
lattice when ordered under set-theoretical inclusion. We denote by FiAL (·)
the closure operator of L-filter generation over the algebra A. The filters
over the algebra Fm are called theories and their collection is denoted by
T hL (instead of FiLFm).
Given an algebra A, we denote its congruence lattice by ConA. The
identity relation on A is denoted by IdA. A congruence θ ∈ ConA is
compatible with a set F ⊆ A if for every a, b ∈ A
if 〈a, b〉 ∈ θ and a ∈ F, then b ∈ F.
Given F ⊆ A, there exists always that largest congruence on A compatible
with F. We denote it by ΩAF and call it the Leibniz congruence of F on A.
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This notion naturally gives rise to a map ΩA : P(A) → ConA, called the
Leibniz operator which plays a fundamental role in this paper.
Lemma 2.1. Let f : A → B be a homomorphism and F ⊆ B. The following
conditions hold:
1. f−1ΩBF ⊆ ΩA f−1[F].
2. If f is surjective, then f−1ΩBF = ΩA f−1[F].
Given an algebra A, a logic L, and a set F ⊆ A, the congruence
∼
ΩAL F :=
⋂{ΩAG : G ∈ FiLA and F ⊆ G}
is called the Suszko congruence of F on A (relative to L). From the definition
of the Suszko congruence, it follows that
∼
ΩAL F ⊆ ΩAF for every F ∈ FiLA. (1)
The Suszko congruence is monotone in the sense that for every F, G ⊆ A
we have:
if F ⊆ G, then ∼ΩAL F ⊆
∼
ΩALG (2)
The Leibniz and Suszko congruences can be characterized in terms of
the indiscernibility of elements with respect to filters in the following
way. Given an algebra A, a function p : An → A is a polynomial function
if there are a natural number m, a formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn+m) and elements
b1, . . . , bm ∈ A such that
p(a1, . . . , an) = ϕA(a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bm)
for every a1, . . . , an ∈ A. Observe that the notation ϕ(x1, . . . , xn+m) means
just that the variables really occurring in ϕ are among, but not necessarily
all, {x1, . . . , xn+m}.
Lemma 2.2. Let A be an algebra, F ⊆ A, and a, b ∈ A.
1. 〈a, b〉 ∈ ΩAF ⇐⇒ (p(a) ∈ F if and only if p(b) ∈ F) for every unary
polynomial function p of A.
2. 〈a, b〉 ∈ ∼ΩAL F ⇐⇒ FiAL (F ∪ {p(a)}) = FiAL (F ∪ {p(b)}) for every unary
polynomial function p of A.
A pair 〈A, F〉 is a matrix if F ⊆ A. The reduction of a matrix 〈A, F〉 is
the matrix 〈A, F〉∗ := 〈A/ΩAF, F/ΩAF〉. Moreover, a matrix 〈A, F〉 is
reduced if ΩAF = IdA. It can be easily seen that the reduction of a matrix is
always reduced. The reduced models, the Lindenbaum-Tarski models, and the
Suszko-reduced models of a given a logic L are, respectively, the following
classes of matrices:
Mod∗L := {〈A, F〉 : F ∈ FiLA and ΩAF = IdA}
LMod∗L := {〈Fm/ΩΓ, Γ/ΩΓ〉 : Γ ∈ T hL}
ModSuL := {〈A, F〉 : F ∈ FiLA and ∼ΩAL F = IdA}.
The logic L is complete with respect to any of the above classes of matrices.
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3. Definability with parameters
Before beginning, let us introduce some terminological convention,
which will considerably simplify the formulation of the main results. We
say that the Leibniz operator ΩA : P(A) → ConA enjoys a certain set-
or order-theoretic property over FiLA, if its restriction to FiLA enjoys
it. Moreover, we say that ΩA almost enjoys that property over FiLA if its
restriction to FiLAr {∅} enjoys it. For example we will say that ΩA is
almost injective over FiLA if ΩA : FiLAr {∅} → ConA is injective. The
reader may wonder why do we care so much about the empty filter. This
is because we will be concerned with several examples of purely inferential
logics, i.e., logics without theorems. And it is easy to prove that ∅ ∈ FiLA
if and only if L is purely inferential. Therefore it will be often the case
that the collection of deductive filters of our logics contains the empty-set,
which represents a limit case and shall be eliminated in the formulation of
the main results (that would be false otherwise). An analogous expedient
will apply to matrices as follows. We say that a matrix 〈A, F〉 is almost
trivial if F = ∅. Accordingly, a matrix 〈A, F〉 is non-almost trivial when it
is not almost trivial. Observe that 〈1,∅〉 is the unique matrix that is both
reduced and almost trivial. A class of matrices M almost enjoys a certain
property, if every non-almost trivial member of M enjoys it.
Definition 3.1. A parametrized equational translation is a set τ (x,~y) ⊆ Eq of
equations in a distinguished variable x with parameters ~y. An equational
translation is a parametrized equational translation without parameters ~y.
Parametrized equational translations witness the definability of truth
sets in classes of matrices by bounding parameters (if any) by an universal
quantifier and considering the solutions of the resulting universally quanti-
fied equations. More precisely, given a parametrized equational translation
τ (x,~y) and an algebra A, we let
τ (A) := {a ∈ A : A  τ (a,~c) for every ~c ∈ A}. (3)
Observe that if τ (x,~y) = τ (x) is an equational translation, then (3) simpli-
fies to the following:
τ (A) = {a ∈ A : A  τ (a)}.
Definition 3.2. A parametrized equational translation (resp. equational
translation) τ defines truth in a class of matrices M, if τ (A) = F for every
〈A, F〉 ∈ M. Truth is parametrically equationally (resp. equationally) definable
in M if there is a parametrized equational translation (resp. equational
translation) that defines truth in M.
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Example 3.3 (Lattices). Let A be a lattice with a maximum element a. Then
consider the matrix 〈A, {a}〉. For every b ∈ A we have that
b = a ⇐⇒ c 6 b for every c ∈ A
⇐⇒ c ∧ b = c for every c ∈ A
⇐⇒ A  τ (b, c) for every c ∈ A
where τ (x,~y) is the parametrized equational translation {x ∧ y ≈ y}. This
shows that τ defines truth in 〈A, {a}〉. On the other hand ifA is non-trivial,
there is no equational translation that defines truth in 〈A, {a}〉. This is due
to the fact that (up to equivalence) the unique lattice equation in variable x
is x ≈ x. The situation changes if we add a constant 1 to the type of A. In
particular, let A+ be the expansion of A where 1 is interpreted as a. Then
truth is equationally definable in 〈A+, {a}〉 by the equational translation
τ (x) = {x ≈ 1}. 
Observe that when truth is almost parametrically equationally definable
in M, the non-almost trivial matrices in M are determined by their algebraic
reduct. More precisely, if 〈A, F〉, 〈A, G〉 ∈ M are non-almost trivial, then
F = G. This observation will be used in several proofs. It is clear that if
truth is equationally definable in M, then it is parametrically equationally
definable too.
We will be interested in logics L for which truth is parametrically equa-
tionally or equationally definable in Mod∗L. For this reason it will be
convenient to introduce some terminological convention. We say that the
truth sets of a logic L are parametrically equationally (resp. equationally)
definable, as an abbreviation for the fact that truth is parametrically equa-
tionally (resp. equationally) definable in Mod∗L. In the case of equational
definability, logics that satisfy this property have been studied in depth in
the literature [12, 24, 25, 32].1 One of the main outcomes of this research line
was the discovery of Raftery [32, Theorem 28] that logics whose truth sets
are equationally definable can be characterized in terms of the behaviour
of the Leibniz operator as follows:
Definition 3.4. Let X and Y be complete lattices and f : X → Y be a map.
f is completely order-reflecting if for every A ∪ {b} ⊆ X,
if
∧
a∈A
f (a) 6 f (b), then
∧
a∈A
a 6 b.
Theorem 3.5 (Raftery). The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) The truth sets of L are equationally definable.
(ii) ΩA : FiLA→ ConA is completely order-reflecting, for every algebra A.
(iii) Ω : T hL → ConFm is completely order-reflecting.
1In [32] Raftery calls truth-equational the logics L for which truth is equationally definable
in Mod∗L. Here we prefer not to give them any particular name, in order to obtain a more
uniform naming scheme when dealing with different kinds of definability conditions.
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In this case τ (x) := σx
∼
ΩLCL{x} defines truth in Mod∗L, where σx is the
substitutions sending every variable to x.
The main goal of this section will be to provide an analogous character-
ization of logics whose truth sets are almost parametrically equationally
definable (Theorem 3.9). One may wonder why we are interested in log-
ics L, whose truth sets are almost parametrically equationally definable,
and not simply parametrically equationally definable. This is because the
notions of equational and parametrized equational definability coincide,
when they are applied to the truth sets of a logic (Corollary 3.10).
Formally speaking an equation equation ε ≈ δ is just a pair 〈ε, δ〉. Thus,
given an algebra A and a tuple ~a ∈ A, the expression εA(~a) ≈ δA(~a) will
denote the pair 〈εA(~a), δA(~a)〉 ∈ A× A. Keeping this in mind, we have the
following:
Lemma 3.6. Let τ (x,~y) be a parametrized equational translation and 〈A, F〉 a
non-almost trivial matrix. τ (x,~y) defines truth in the reduction 〈A, F〉∗ if and
only if for every a ∈ A,
a ∈ F ⇐⇒ τA(a,~c) ⊆ ΩAF for every~c ∈ A.
Proof. Apply the fact that ΩAF is compatible with F. 
The first fact that it is worth to remark is the following:
Lemma 3.7. A parametrized equational translation almost defines truth in Mod∗L
if and only if it almost defines truth in LMod∗L.
Proof. It will be enough to check the “if” part. Let τ be a parametrized
equational translation which almost defines truth in LMod∗L. We want
to show that τ almost defines truth in Mod∗L too. By Lemma 3.6 this
amounts to proving that for every algebra A, F ∈ FiLAr {∅} and a ∈ A:
a ∈ F ⇐⇒ τA(a,~c) ⊆ ΩAF for every ~c ∈ A. (4)
First recall that LMod∗L is (up to isomorphism) the class of countably
generated reduced models of L. Together with Lemma 3.6, this implies
that (4) holds in case A is countably generated.
Then consider the case where A is not countably generated. We begin
by proving the “if” part of (4). Let a ∈ A and F ∈ FiLA r {∅} be
such that τA(a,~c) ⊆ ΩAF for every ~c ∈ A. Then choose any b ∈ F and
consider the subalgebra of B of A generated by {a, b}. Let G := F ∩ B.
Observe that G ∈ FiLBr {∅}, since b ∈ G. Moreover, we have τB(a,~c) ⊆
ΩAF ∩ (B× B) ⊆ ΩBG for every ~c ∈ B. Since B is countably generated,
we conclude that a ∈ G ⊆ F.
Now we prove the “only if” part of (4). Suppose that a ∈ F. Then
consider ε ≈ δ ∈ τ and ~c ∈ A. Let also p(x) : A → A be a unary
polynomial function. By definition there is an (n + 1)-ary term ϕ and a
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sequence ~e of n elements of A such that ϕA(b,~e) = p(b) for every b ∈ A.
We will prove that
p(εA(a,~c)) ∈ F ⇐⇒ p(δA(a,~c)) ∈ F. (5)
First suppose that p(εA(a,~c)) ∈ F. Then consider the subalgebra B of
A generated by {a, e1, . . . , en, c1, . . . , ck}, where c1, . . . ck are the elements
of ~c corresponding to the variables in ~y occurring in ε and δ. Then let
G := F ∩ B. We know that G ∈ FiLB r {∅}, because a ∈ G. Since B is
countably generated and a ∈ G, we have that
〈εB(a, c1, . . . , ck), δB(a, c1, . . . , ck)〉 ∈ ΩBG.
Since p(εB(a,~c)) ∈ G, by compatibility we obtain that p(δB(a,~c)) ∈ G ⊆ F.
This establishes condition (5). By point 1 of Lemma 2.2, we conclude that
〈εA(a,~c), δA(a,~c)〉 ∈ ΩAF. 
The following technical result is stated without a detailed proof in [11,
Proposition 1.5(8)] and will be needed in the sequel.
Lemma 3.8 (Czelakowski). σ
∼
ΩLCL{x} ⊆ ∼ΩLCL{σx} for every substitution
σ.
Proof. Consider a pair 〈ϕ,ψ〉 ∈ ∼ΩLCL{x}. We have to prove that 〈σϕ, σψ〉 ∈∼
ΩLCL{σx}. By point 2 of Lemma 2.2 it will be enough to check that
γ(σ(ϕ),~z), σx a`L σx,γ(σ(ψ),~z), for every γ(x,~z) ∈ Fm.
To this end, consider γ(x,~z) ∈ Fm and a new substitution σ such that:
1. σ and σ′ coincide on the variables actually occurring in ϕ and ψ.
2. For every variable v 6= x actually occurring in γ, there is a variable u
such that σ′(u) = v.
Now, consider the formula δ obtained by replacing in γ each variable v 6= x
by the corresponding u. Applying point 2 of Lemma 2.2 to the fact that
〈ϕ,ψ〉 ∈ ∼ΩLCL{x}, we obtain that
x, δ(ϕ,~u) a`L δ(ψ,~u), x.
By structurality we obtain that
σ′x, σ′δ(ϕ,~u) a`L σ′δ(ψ,~u), σ′x.
But this is exactly γ(σ(ϕ),~z), σx a`L σx,γ(σ(ψ),~z). 
The next result provides a characterization of the logics whose truth sets
are almost parametrically equationally definable in terms of the behaviour
of the Leibniz operator. One can read the result as stating that the class of
logics whose truth sets are almost parametrically equationally definable
belongs to the Leibniz hierarchy.
Theorem 3.9. The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) The truth sets of L are almost parametrically equationally definable.
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(ii) ΩA : FiLA→ ConA is almost completely order-reflecting, for every alge-
bra A.
(iii) Ω : T hL → ConFm is almost completely order-reflecting.
In this case τ (x,~y) :=
∼
ΩLCL{x} almost defines truth in Mod∗L.
Proof. (i)⇒(ii): Consider an arbitrary algebra A and let F ∪ {G} ⊆ FiLAr
{∅} such that ⋂{ΩAF : F ∈ F} ⊆ ΩAG. We proceed to show that⋂F ⊆ G. To this end, consider a ∈ ⋂F . From Lemma 3.6 and the
assumptions it follows that
τA(a,~c) ⊆ ΩAF for every ~c ∈ A and F ∈ F .
This implies that τA(a,~c) ⊆ ΩAG for every ~c ∈ A. With another applica-
tion of Lemma 3.6 we conclude that a ∈ G.
(ii)⇒(iii): Straightforward. (iii)⇒(i): Choose a variable x and define
τ (x,~y) :=
∼
ΩLCL{x} where ~y is the list of all variables different from x.
Thanks to Lemma 3.7 it will be enough to prove that τ almost defines truth
in LMod∗L. By Lemma 3.6 this reduces to proving the following:
Γ `L ϕ if and only if τ (ϕ,~γ) ⊆ ΩΓ for every ~γ ∈ Fm (6)
for every ϕ ∈ Fm and Γ ∈ T hLr {∅}. For the “only if” part of (6) suppose
that Γ `L ϕ. Then consider any sequence ~γ ∈ Fm and let σ be a substitution
sending x to ϕ and ~y to ~γ. Applying Lemma 3.8, we obtain that
τ (ϕ,~γ) = στ (x,~y) = σ
∼
ΩLCL{x} ⊆ ∼ΩLCL{σx}
=
∼
ΩLCL{ϕ} ⊆ ∼ΩLΓ ⊆ ΩΓ.
Then we turn to prove the “if” part of (6). Suppose that τ (ϕ,~γ) ⊆ ΩΓ
for every sequence ~γ ∈ Fm. Recall that Γ 6= ∅. Then we can choose a
formula ψ ∈ Γ and consider the substitution σ defined as
σ(z) =
{
ϕ if z = x
ψ otherwise
for every variable z. From Lemma 2.1 and the assumption it follows that
∼
ΩCL{x} = τ (x,~y) ⊆ σ−1ΩΓ ⊆ Ωσ−1Γ.
Since inverse images of theories under substitutions are theories, we know
that σ−1Γ ∈ T hL. Moreover, observe that y ∈ σ−1Γ for every variable
different from x. Thus σ−1Γ 6= ∅. Therefore we can apply the fact that
Ω is completely order-reflecting over T hLr {∅} and get CL{x} ⊆ σ−1Γ.
This yields that ϕ ∈ Γ and concludes the proof of condition (6). 
Combining Theorems 3.9 and 3.5 we can prove a surprising result,
namely that truth is parametrically equationally definable in the whole
class of Leibniz-reduced models of a logic if and only if it is equationally
definable in it.
Corollary 3.10. The following conditions are equivalent:
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(i) The truth sets of L are equationally definable.
(ii) The truth sets of L are parametrically equationally definable.
(iii) The truth sets of L are almost parametrically equationally definable and L
has theorems.
In particular, if truth is equationally definable in Mod∗L, then L has theorems.
Proof. (i)⇒(ii): Straightforward. (ii)⇒(iii): Suppose towards a contradiction
that L is purely inferential, i.e., that ∅ ∈ T hL. Then both 〈1, {1}〉 and
〈1,∅〉 are reduced models of L. But this contradicts the fact that truth is
parametrically equationally definable in Mod∗L. (iii)⇒(i): Together with
Theorem 3.9, the assumption implies that Ω is completely order-reflecting
over T hL. Thus with an application of Theorem 3.5 we are done. 
From Corollary 3.10 it follows that the notion of parametrized equa-
tional definability makes sense only for purely inferential logics since, in the
presence of theorems, it collapses into that of equational definability. It is
worth to observe that the class of all logics, whose truth sets are almost
parametrically equationally definable, is the first known class in the Leibniz
hierarchy that admits non-trivial purely inferential logics. More in detail,
until to now the weakest conditions considered in the study of the Leibniz
hierarchy were protoalgebraicity and having truth sets equationally definable.
It is well known that the unique purely inferential protoalgebraic logic
(in a given language) is the almost inconsistent one,2 while the fact that
logics whose truth sets are equationally definable have theorems is stated
in Corollary 3.10.
Corollary 3.11. Let L be a logic whose truth sets are almost parametrically equa-
tionally definable. There is a conservative expansion L′ of L, where the expansion
consists in adding a new constant symbol 1, such that truth is equationally defin-
able in Mod∗L′.
Proof. Let τ (x,~y) be the parametrized equational translation that almost
defines truth in Mod∗L. Then let K be the class of algebras obtained by
expanding the algebras in Alg∗L with a fresh constant 1, that is interpreted
arbitrarily in the set of solutions of τ . Observe that an algebra A ∈ Alg∗L
can be expanded in different ways if τ (A) has more than one element.
Then let L′ be the logic determined by the following class of matrices:
{〈A, τ (A)〉 : A ∈ K}.
It is easy to see that L′ is a conservative expansion of L. Since the expansion
consists in adding a constant symbol and the presence of constants does
not affect congruences, we obtain that if 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod∗L′, then 〈A′, F〉 ∈
Mod∗L where A′ is the 1-free reduct of A. Thus from the fact that the
truth sets of L are almost parametrically equationally definable, we can
2Within a fixed algebraic language, the almost inconsistent logic is the unique logic L such
that T hL = {∅, Fm}.
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assume that the same holds for L′. Now observe that L′ has theorems,
since ∅ `L′ 1. Thus, with an application of Corollary 3.10 we conclude that
truth is equationally definable in Mod∗L′. 
Problem 1. In [32, Theorem 11] it is shown that the truth sets of a logic L
are equationally definable if and only if the
∼
ΩAL : FiLA→ ConA is injective
for every algebra A. Is it possible to produce a similar characterization of
almost parametrized equational definability?
4. Semilattice-based examples
In this section we review a family of natural examples of logics whose
truth sets are almost parametrically equationally, but not equationally,
definable. In the light of Corollary 3.10 we know that all these examples
need to be purely inferential.
Example 4.1 (Distributive Lattices). Let be the 〈∧,∨〉-fragment of classi-
cal propositional logic. For every non-almost trivial matrix 〈A, F〉 ∈
Mod∗CPC∧∨ the following conditions hold:
(i) A is a distributive lattice with a maximum 1.
(ii) F = {1}.
(iii) For every a, b ∈ A, if a < b, then there is c ∈ A such that a ∨ c 6= 1
and a ∨ c = 1.
This was proved in [17, Pag. 127], but see [22] for further information on the
logic CPC∧∨. In particular, this result implies that the truth sets of CPC∧∨
are almost parametrically equationally definable through the parametrized
equational translation τ (x,~y) = {x ∧ y ≈ y}, as shown in Example 3.3. 
Example 4.2 (Semilattices). Let CPC∧ be the 〈∧〉-fragment of classical propo-
sitional logic. Let also 2 = 〈{0, 1},∧〉 be the two-element meet semilattice
with 0 < 1. Every non-almost trivial member of Mod∗CPC∧ is an isomor-
phic copy either of 〈2, {1}〉 or of 〈1, {1}〉. This was first claimed in [34, Pag.
68-69], but see [20, Corollary 6.3] or [21, Lemma 3.1] for an explicit proof. It
follows that the truth sets of CPC∧ are almost parametrically equationally
definable by the parametrized equational translation τ (x,~y) = {x ∧ y ≈ y}.
Let CPC∨ be the 〈∨〉-fragment of classical propositional logic. The non-
almost trivial members of Mod∗CPC∨ can be characterized exactly as those
of CPC∧∨ in Example 4.1, but replacing distributive lattice by semilattice [34,
Pag. 68-69]. It follows that the truth sets of CPC∨ are almost parametrically
equationally definable by the parametrized equational translation τ (x,~y) =
{x ∨ y ≈ x}. 
Until now we saw that the truth sets of CPC∧∨, CPC∧ and CPC∨ are
almost parametrically equationally definable. The fact that the truth predi-
cates of these logics are not equationally definable follows from the fact that
(up to equivalence) the unique lattice or semilattice equation in variable
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x is x ≈ x. The examples considered so far are particular instances of the
following general phenomenon:
Lemma 4.3. Let K be a class of algebras with meet (join) semilattice reduct. The
truth sets of the logic L determined by the class of matrices
{〈A, {1}〉 : A ∈ K has a top element 1}
are almost parametrically equationally definable.
Proof. We claim that Alg∗L ⊆ V(K). To prove this, consider an equation
ϕ ≈ ψ that holds in K. We want to show that for every ~a ∈ A, we have
〈ϕA(~a),ψA(~a)〉 ∈ IdA = ΩAF. By Lemma 2.2 this amounts to showing
that for every unary polynomial function p of A we have that
p(ϕA(~a)) ∈ F ⇐⇒ p(ψA(~a)) ∈ F. (7)
We know that there are a formula δ(x,~z) and a tuple ~c ∈ A such that
p(x) = δA(x,~c). We can assume w.l.o.g. that the tuple ~z does not contain
any variable occurring in ϕ or ψ. Since the equation ϕ ≈ ψ holds in K, we
have that
K  δ(ϕ,~z) ≈ δ(ψ,~z). (8)
The fact that L is defined by a class of matrices that have algebraic reducts
in K, together with (8) implies that
δ(ϕ,~z) a`L δ(ψ,~z).
This establishes condition (7) and concludes the proof of the claim.
Now observe that L is determined by matrices whose filters are single-
tons. A standard argument [1, Theorem 10] shows that F is a singleton
for every non-almost trivial 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod∗L. Then consider one of these
models 〈A, F〉. From our claim it follows that A ∈ V(K), thus A has a
meet-semilattice reduct 〈A,∧〉. Observe that by definition of L
x, y `L x ∧ y x ∧ y `L x x ∧ y `L y.
Thus F is a filter of 〈A,∧〉 which, moreover, is a singleton. Hence 〈A,∧〉
has a top element 1 such that F = {1}. We conclude that truth is almost
parametrically equationally definable in Mod∗L via τ (x,~y) := {x ∧ y ≈
y}. 
It makes sense to wonder whether there are examples of meaningful
logics whose truth set are almost parametrically equationally (but not
equationally), except from those that fall under the scope of Lemma 4.3.
One of them comes from the study of bilattices, i.e., algebras which have
two lattice-theoretic order relations.
Example 4.4 (Distributive Bilattices). An algebra L = 〈L,∧,∨,⊗,⊕〉 is a
pre-bilattice if 〈L,∧,∨〉 and 〈L,⊗,⊕〉 are lattices. In this case we will de-
note by 6 the lattice order associated with 〈L,∧,∨〉 and by v the one
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associated with 〈L,⊗,⊕〉. An algebra A = 〈A,∧,∨,⊗,⊕,¬〉 is a bilattice if
〈A,∧,∨,⊗,⊕〉 is a pre-bilattice such that ¬¬a = a and
a 6 b =⇒ (¬b 6 ¬a and ¬a v ¬b)
for every a, b ∈ A [23]. A bilattice is distributive if the four lattice operations
satisfy all the combined distributive axioms. Distributive bilattices form a
variety which we denote by DBL. This variety is generated by the bilattice
B4 with universe {0, 1, a, b}, where 〈B4,v〉 is the four-element diamond
bounded by 0 < 1, while 〈B4,6〉 is the four-element diamond bounded by
a < b, and ¬ interchanges a and b and is the identity on {0, 1}.
The so-called logic of distributive bilattices LB is defined through the
matrix 〈B4, {b, 1}〉, see [7, 35]. By Corollary 3.10 truth is not equationally
definable in Mod∗LB, since LB is purely inferential. This is a consequence
of the fact that {0} is the universe of a subalgebra of B4. Our goal will
be to prove that truth is almost parametrically equationally definable in
Mod∗LB. To this end, we need to recall the following construction from [7].
Given a distributive lattice L = 〈L,u,unionsq〉, let LL = 〈L× L,∧,∨,⊗,⊕,¬〉
be the twist structure defined as
〈a1, a2〉 ∧ 〈b1, b2〉 := 〈a1 u b1, a2 unionsq b2〉
〈a1, a2〉 ∨ 〈b1, b2〉 := 〈a1 unionsq b1, a2 u b2〉
〈a1, a2〉 ⊗ 〈b1, b2〉 := 〈a1 u b1, a2 u b2〉
〈a1, a2〉 ⊕ 〈b1, b2〉 := 〈a1 unionsq b1, a2 unionsq b2〉
¬〈a1, a2〉 := 〈a2, a1〉
for every 〈a1, a2〉, 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ L× L. It turns out that LL ∈ DBL.
It turns out that the parametrized equational translation τ (x,~y) :=
{(x⊕ y)∧ x ≈ x⊕ y} almost defines truth in Mod∗LB. To see this, observe
that if 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod∗LB is non-almost trivial, then A ∼= LL for some
lattice L such that the following conditions hold:
(i) L is a distributive lattice with maximum 1.
(ii) F ∼= {1} × L.
(iii) For every a, b ∈ L, if a < b, then there is c ∈ L such that a unionsq c <
b unionsq c = 1.
This was proved in [7, Theorem 4.13]. For the sake of simplicity, we assume
that A = LL. For every 〈a1, a2, 〉, 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ A we have that
A  τ (〈a1, a2〉, 〈b1, b2〉)⇐⇒ b1 6 a1.
This yields that τ (A) = {1} × L, matching condition (ii) above. 
All the logics considered so far were equipped either with a disjunction
or with a conjunction, which was interpreted as a semilattice operation.
Remarkably, within the landscape of Fregean logics, the presence of a weak
disjunction (conjunction) forces the truth sets to be almost parametrically
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equationally definable. Recall that a logic L is Fregean if for every set of
formulas Γ the following relation is a congruence of the term algebra Fm:
ΛLΓ := {〈ϕ,ψ〉 ∈ Fm2 : Γ, ϕ a`L ψ, Γ}.
Equivalently, a logic is Fregean when
∼
ΩLΓ = ΛLΓ for every Γ ∈ T hL.
Fregean logics have been studied in depth [2, 10, 13, 14], but here we will
rely only on their definition.
Definition 4.5. A logic L has a protodisjunction3 if there is a binary term ∨
such that x `L x ∨ y and y `L x ∨ y.
Observe that every logic with theorems has a protodisjunction. This can
be easily proved by showing that each theorem can be converted into a
protodisjunction, by replacing each variable occurring in it by the variable
x.
Theorem 4.6. If L is Fregean and has a protodisjunction, then the parametrized
equational translation τ (x,~y) = {x ∨ y ≈ x} almost defines truth in Mod∗L.
Proof. Thanks to Lemma 3.7 it will be enough to prove that τ almost defines
truth in LMod∗L. By Lemma 3.6 this amounts to checking that
Γ `L ϕ if and only if 〈ϕ, ϕ ∨ ψ〉 ∈ ΩΓ for every ψ ∈ Fm
for every Γ ∈ T hLr {∅} and ϕ ∈ Fm. For the “only if” part assume that
Γ `L ϕ and observe that ϕ, Γ a`L Γ, ϕ∨ ψ, because ∨ is a protodisjunction.
Since L is Fregean, this implies that 〈ϕ, ϕ ∨ ψ〉 ∈ ΛLΓ = ∼ΩLΓ ⊆ ΩΓ. For
the “if” part choose ψ ∈ Γ. This can be done since Γ 6= ∅. Since ∨ is a
protodisjunction, we have that Γ `L ϕ ∨ ψ. By compatibility we conclude
that Γ `L ϕ. 
Drawing consequences from this result, we obtain an essentially different
proof of the following known result [1, Theorem 14]:
Corollary 4.7. A Fregean logic L has theorems if and only if truth is equationally
definable in Mod∗L.
Proof. The “if” part was proven in Corollary 3.10. For the “only if” part,
let L be a Fregean logic with theorems. In particular, L has a protodisjunc-
tion. Thus from Theorem 4.6 it follows that truth is almost parametrically
equationally definable in Mod∗L. Together with Corollary 3.10 and the fact
that L has theorems, this implies that truth is equationally definable in
Mod∗L. 
Now we consider Fregean logics with a binary connective which behaves
like a weak conjunction.
3It is worth to remark that a more general notion of protodisjunction was introduced
in [31, Convention 3.1], where protodisjunctions are understood as sets of formulas in two
variables.
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Definition 4.8. A logic L has a protoconjunction if there is a binary term ∧
such that {x, y} `L x ∧ y, {x, x ∧ y} `L y and {y, x ∧ y} `L x.
Theorem 4.9. If L is Fregean and has a protoconjunction, then the parametrized
equational translation τ (x,~y) = {x ∧ y ≈ y} almost defines truth in Mod∗L.
Proof. Again it will be enough to prove that
Γ `L ϕ if and only if 〈ψ, ϕ ∧ ψ〉 ∈ ΩΓ for every ψ ∈ Fm
for every Γ ∈ T hLr {∅} and ϕ ∈ Fm. For the “only if” part observe that
if Γ `L ϕ, then ψ, Γ a`L Γ, ϕ ∧ ψ since ∧ is a protoconjunction. Since L is
Fregean, this implies that 〈ψ, ϕ ∧ ψ〉 ∈ Λ(T hL)Γ = ∼ΩLΓ ⊆ ΩΓ. For the
“if” part choose ψ ∈ Γ. This can be done since Γ 6= ∅. By compatibility
we have that Γ `L ϕ ∧ ψ. Since ∧ is a protoconjunction, we conclude that
Γ `L ϕ. 
5. Implicit definability
Definition 5.1. Truth is implicitly definable in a class of matrices M if the ele-
ments of M are determined by their algebraic reducts, i.e., if 〈A, F〉, 〈A, G〉 ∈
M, then F = G.
Similarly, we say that truth is almost implicitly definable in a class of
matrices M when truth is implicitly definable in the class of non-almost
trivial members of M.
It is clear that (almost) implicit definability generalizes (almost) parametrized
equational definability. Following our convention, we say that the truth sets
of a logic L are (almost) implicitly definable, when truth is (almost) implic-
itly definable in Mod∗L. The following observation is a straightforward
application of the definitions:
Lemma 5.2. The truth sets of L are (almost) implicitly definable if and only if
ΩA : FiLA→ ConA is (almost) injective for every algebra A.
When applied to classes of matrices, the concept of implicit definabil-
ity has been inspired by Beth’s definability theorem which states that
in first-order logic explicit definability and implicit definability coincide.
In particular, Blok and Pigozzi [4], Hermann [24, 26], Czelakowski and
Jansana [12] and Raftery [32] proved a series of increasingly more general
results, collectively called Beth’s definability theorems, whose main outcomes
are summarized in the next result. Recall that a logic L is protoalgebraic
[3, 8, 9] if there is a set of formulas ∆(x, y) such that
∅ `L ∆(x, x) x,∆(x, y) `L y.
A logic is mono-unary [6, 32] when its language consists of just one symbol
that, moreover, has arity 1 (so that constants are not allowed). The following
form of the theorem is due to Raftery [32, Corollary 29, Theorems 36 and
46].
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Theorem 5.3 (Beth’s definability). The notions of implicit and equational de-
finability coincide when applied to the class of Suszko-reduced models of a logic.
Moreover, if a logic L is either protoalgebraic or mono-unary and its truth predi-
cates are implicitly definable, then they are equationally definable as well.
Related to the study of Beth’s definability theorems, another question
inspired the research on the notion of implicit definability in matrix seman-
tics. This is the so-called transfer problem that asks whether the injectivity
of the Leibniz operator transfers, in general, from the theories of a given
logic to its deductive filters over arbitrary algebras. In other words the
problem asks whether it is enough to check that truth is implicitly definable
in LMod∗L, in order to conclude that the truth sets of L are implicitly
definable (cfr. Lemma 5.2). Czelakowski and Jansana [12] and Raftery [32]
proved respectively that the transfer problem has a positive answer both for
protoalgebraic and mono-unary logics. In this contribution, we show that
the transfer problem has a negative solution in general solving [32, Problem
1], see also [15]. On the other hand, we prove that a positive answer can
be recovered for logics expressed in a countable language, generalizing
Raftery’s result on mono-unary logics. Moreover, we offer a new and more
elementary proof of Jansana and Czelakowski’s result on protoalgebraic
logic. We begin by this last point:
Theorem 5.4 (Czelakowski and Jansana). For protoalgebraic logics the in-
jectivity of the Leibniz operator transfers from theories to filters over arbitrary
algebras.
Alternative proof. Suppose that L is protoalgebraic and that Ω is injective
over T hL. We will show that Ω is also completely order-reflecting over
T hL. Consider a family Σ∪ {Γ} ⊆ T hL such that ⋂{ΩΓ′ : Γ′ ∈ Σ} ⊆ ΩΓ.
It is well known that the fact that a logic L′ is protoalgebraic is equivalent
to the fact that ΩAF =
∼
ΩL′F for every algebra A and filter F ∈ FiL′A [16,
Theorem 6.7]. Keeping this in mind, we obtain that:
Ω
⋂
Σ =
∼
ΩL
⋂
Σ ⊆ ⋂{ΩΓ′ : Γ′ ∈ Σ} ⊆ ΩΓ
Moreover, a logic L′ is protoalgebraic if and only if ΩA : FiL′A→ ConA
commutes with arbitrary meets for every algebra A [16, Proposition 6.14].
Applying this property to L, we obtain that
Ω
⋂
Σ = ΩΓ ∩Ω⋂Σ = Ω(Γ ∩⋂Σ).
Since Ω is injective over T hL, we conclude that ⋂Σ = Γ ∩ ⋂Σ, that is⋂
Σ ⊆ Γ. With an application of Theorem 3.5 we are done. 
In fact the proof presented above shows more than what is contained in
the statement of Theorem 5.4. Namely, it establishes the part of the Beth’s
Definability Theorem 5.3 concerning protoalgebraic logics. Now we turn to
prove that the transfer problem has a positive solution for logics expressed
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in a countable language. To this end, we will make use of the following
technical result which generalizes [10, Proposition 0.7.6].
Lemma 5.5. Let κ be an infinite cardinal larger or equal to the cardinality of
the language |L | and let 〈A, F〉 and 〈A, G〉 be a pair of reduced matrices. Every
κ-generated subalgebraC ofA can be extended to another κ-generated subalgebra
B of A such that the matrices 〈B, F ∩ B〉 and 〈B, G ∩ B〉 are reduced.
Proof. First observe that κ-generated algebras are of cardinality 6 κ, since κ
is infinite and larger or equal to |L |. Then we define recursively an infinite
family of subsets of A. We begin with X0 := C. To define Xn+1, we go
through the following construction: for every pair of different elements
a, b ∈ SgA(Xn) we pick two finite sequences ~c and ~d of elements of A for
which there is a pair of formulas ϕ(x,~y) and ψ(x,~z) such that
ϕA(a,~c) ∈ F ⇐⇒ ϕA(b,~c) /∈ F
ψA(a, ~d) ∈ G ⇐⇒ ψA(b, ~d) /∈ G.
The existence of the sequences ~c and ~d is ensured by point 1 of Lemma 2.2
together with the fact that 〈a, b〉 /∈ IdA = ΩAF = ΩAG. We then let Yn be
the set of all elements in the sequences constructed in this way. Finally we
set
Xn+1 := Xn ∪Yn.
Now consider the union
⋃
n∈ω SgA(Xn). It is easy to prove that it is the
universe of a subalgebra B of A. Clearly B extends C, since X0 = C.
We claim that 〈B, F ∩ B〉 is reduced. To prove this, consider two different
a, b ∈ B. There is n ∈ ω such that a, b ∈ SgA(Xn). By definition of Xn+1,
we know that there is a finite sequence~c of elements of Xn+1 and a formula
ϕ(x,~y) such that ϕA(a,~c) ∈ F ⇐⇒ ϕA(b,~c) /∈ F. Since a, b,~c ∈ B and B is
a subalgebra of A, we conclude that ϕB(a,~c), ϕB(b,~c) ∈ B and, finally, that
ϕB(a,~c) ∈ F ∩ B⇐⇒ ϕB(b,~c) /∈ F ∩ B.
By point 1 of Lemma 2.2 we conclude that 〈a, b〉 /∈ ΩB(F∩ B) and therefore
that ΩB(F∩ B) = 0B . This concludes the proof of our claim. An analogous
argument yields that the the matrix 〈B, G ∩ B〉 is reduced too.
It only remains to show that B is κ-generated. We begin by showing
inductively that |Xn| 6 κ for every n ∈ ω. For n = 0 we have that
X0 = C. Recall from the assumption that C is κ-generated and, therefore,
of cardinality 6 κ. For the n + 1 case observe that, by the inductive
hypothesis, |Xn| 6 κ. Then SgA(Xn) is κ-generated and again of cardinality
6 κ. Now observe that, while constructing Yn, we added to Xn at most a
finite number of elements for every pair of elements of SgA(Xn). Therefore
the cardinality of Yn can be bounded above by ℵ0 · |SgA(Xn)| · |SgA(Xn)|.
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In particular, this yields that
|Yn| 6 ℵ0 · |SgA(Xn)| · |SgA(Xn)| 6 ℵ0 · (κ · κ) 6 κ.
Since Xn+1 = Xn ∪ Yn is the union of two sets of cardinality smaller or
equal to κ, we conclude that |Xn+1| 6 κ. This concludes our proof by
induction. Then let n ∈ ω. The fact that |Xn| 6 κ implies that SgA(Xn)is of
cardinality 6 κ. Thus B = ⋃n∈ω SgA(Xn) is the union of countably many
sets of cardinality smaller of equal to κ. Since κ is infinite, we conclude that
B has cardinality 6 κ, hence a fortiori it is κ-generated. 
We are now ready to prove our transfer result:
Theorem 5.6. For logics expressed in a countable language the (almost) injectiv-
ity of the Leibniz operator transfers from theories to filters over arbitrary algebras.
Proof. We apply Lemma 5.2. Consider two reduced models 〈A, F〉 and
〈A, G〉 of L. We have to prove that F = G. By symmetry it is enough to
prove that F ⊆ G. Consider an element a ∈ F and letC be the subalgebra of
A generated by {a}. Clearly C is countably generated. Since |L | 6 ℵ0, we
can apply Lemma 5.5 and extend C to a countably generated subalgebra B
ofA such that both 〈B, F∩ B〉 and 〈B, G∩ B〉 are reduced matrices. Clearly
they are both models of L. Since B is countably generated, we can choose
a surjective homomorphism h : Fm→ B. Then we define Γ := h−1[F ∩ B]
and Γ′ := h−1[G ∩ B]. We have Γ, Γ ∈ T hL. With an application of Lemma
2.1 we obtain
ΩΓ = Ωh−1[F ∩ B] = h−1ΩB(F ∩ B) = h−10B
= h−1ΩB(G ∩ B) = Ωh−1[G ∩ B] = ΩΓ′.
Together with the assumption, this implies that Γ = Γ′. In particular, this
implies that a ∈ F ∩ B = G ∩ B ⊆ G. This concludes the proof that F ⊆ G
and therefore we are done. The almost case follows by restricting the proof
to non-empty filters. 
Corollary 5.7 (Raftery). For mono-unary logics the injectivity of the Leibniz
operator transfers from theories to filters over arbitrary algebras.
The following problem was raised by J. Gil-Fe´rez in a private communi-
cation:
Problem 2. Is it possible to view Theorems 5.4 and 5.6 as special instances
of some more general phenomenon?
6. Failure of the transfer of injectivity
As we mentioned, if we move our attention to logics expressed in un-
countable languages, it is possible to construct examples where the injec-
tivity of the Leibniz operator does not transfer from theories to deductive
filters over arbitrary algebras. We devote this section to the description of
such an example.
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Let R be the set of real numbers. We consider the algebraic type that
consists of a set of binary connectives {(i: i ∈ R r {1, 2}}, a set of
constants {ci : i ∈ Rr {2}} and a unary connective . Then let A be the
algebra with universe
A := ((Rr {2})× {0}) ∪ (R× {1})
and operations defined as follows:
〈a1, a2〉(i 〈b1, b2〉 :=
{
〈1, 1〉 if a1 = b1 = i, a2 = 0 and b2 = 1
〈1, 0〉 otherwise
〈a1, a2〉 :=
{
〈1, 1〉 if either a2 = 0 or (a2 = 1 and a1 < 2)
〈1, 0〉 otherwise
ci := 〈i, 1〉
for every 〈a1, a2〉, 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ A. To simplify the notation put
F := R× {1} and G := (R× {1})r {〈2, 1〉}.
We consider the logic L determined by the pair of matrices 〈A, F〉 and
〈A, G〉.
Fact 6.1. ΩA is not injective over FiLA.
Proof. We claim that for every pair of different 〈a1, a2〉, 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ A, there
is a polynomial function p(z) of A that satisfies one of the following
conditions:
p〈a1, a2〉 ∈ F ∩ G and p〈b1, b2〉 /∈ F ∪ G
p〈b1, b2〉 ∈ F ∩ G and p〈a1, a2〉 /∈ F ∪ G.
We split the proof of the claim in three main cases:
1. a2 6= b2.
2. a2 = b2 = 0.
3. a2 = b2 = 1.
1. Assume w.l.o.g. that a2 = 0 and b2 = 1. If b1 6= 2, then 〈a1, a2〉 /∈ F ∪ G
and 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ F ∩ G. Then suppose that b1 = 2. We have that
〈a1, a2〉 = 〈1, 1〉 ∈ F ∩ G and 〈b1, b2〉 = 〈1, 0〉 /∈ F ∪ G.
2. Since 〈a1, a2〉 6= 〈b1, b2〉, we have that either a1 6= 1 or b1 6= 1. Assume
w.l.o.g. that a1 6= 1. We consider the unary polynomial function
p(z) := z(a1 〈a1, 1〉.
Observe that the operation(a1 exists, since a1 /∈ {1, 2}. Clearly we have
that p〈a1, a2〉 ∈ F ∩ G, while p〈b1, b2〉 /∈ F ∪ G.
3. We have two subcases: either {a1, b1} 6= {1, 2} or {a1, b1} = {1, 2}.
Suppose that {a1, b1} 6= {1, 2}. Since 〈a1, a2〉 6= 〈b1, b2〉 and a2 = b2, we
know that a1 6= b2. Together with the fact that {a1, b1} 6= {1, 2}, this implies
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that either a1 /∈ {1, 2} or b1 /∈ {1, 2}. Assume w.l.o.g. that a1 /∈ {1, 2}. Then
we can safely consider the polynomial function
p(z) := 〈a1, 0〉(a1 z.
It is easy to see that p〈a1, a2〉 ∈ F ∩ G, while p〈b1, b2〉 /∈ F ∪ G. Then we
consider the case where {a1, b1} = {1, 2}. Assume w.l.o.g. that a1 = 1 and
b1 = 2. We have that
〈a1, a2〉 = 〈1, 1〉 ∈ F ∩ G and 〈b1, b2〉 = 〈1, 0〉 /∈ G ∪ F.
This establishes our claim. From Lemma 2.2 it follows that ΩAF = ΩAG.
Since F 6= G we are done. 
Fact 6.2. Consider Γ ∈ T hL, ϕ ∈ Γ and a formula of the form α(z)(i β(z) in
which z actually occurs. If Γ `L α(ϕ)(i β(ϕ), then 〈ϕ, ci〉 ∈ ΩΓ.
Proof. Suppose that Γ `L α(ϕ)(i β(ϕ). By Lemma 2.2 it will be enough
to prove that h(ϕ) = h(ci) for every homomorphism h : Fm→ A such that
h[Γ] ⊆ R× {1}. Then consider an homomorphism h of this kind. Since
h[Γ] ⊆ R× {1} we have that h(α(ϕ) (i β(ϕ)) ∈ R× {1}. Looking at
the definition of(i, it is easy to see that this happens only if h(α(ϕ)(i
β(ϕ)) = 〈1, 1〉. In particular, this is to say that
hα(ϕ) = 〈i, 0〉 and hβ(ϕ) = 〈i, 1〉.
Looking at the definition of the basic operations of A and keeping in mind
that i ∈ Rr {1, 2}, it is possible to see that α(ϕ) must be a variable and
that β(ϕ) must be either a variable or ci. Then we have cases:
either α(ϕ)(i β(ϕ) = x(i y or α(ϕ)(i β(ϕ) = x(i ci (9)
for some variables x and y. Now, from the assumption we know that z
occurs in α(z)(i β(z). We claim that z does not appear really in α(z). To
prove this, suppose the contrary towards a contradiction. By (9) we would
have that ϕ = x. Then
hϕ = hα(ϕ) = 〈i, 0〉 /∈ R× {1}.
But this contradicts the fact that Γ `L ϕ, establishing the claim. In particular,
the claim implies that z occurs in β(z). Together with (9), this means that
β(ϕ) = ϕ. This easily implies that
h(ϕ) = hβ(ϕ) = 〈i, 1〉 = h(ci)
establishing the fact. 
Fact 6.3. If ϕ is neither a variable nor a constant, then ∅ `L ϕ.
Proof. Observe that x and (x (i y) are theorems of L, for every
i /∈ {1, 2}. This follows directly from the definition of L. In particular, this
implies that also ϕ is a theorem. 
Fact 6.4. For every Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm one of the following conditions hold:
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1. For every i < 2 and formula α(z) in which z actually occurs: Γ `L α(ϕ)⇐⇒
Γ `L α(ci).
2. For every i > 2 and formula α(z) in which z actually occurs: Γ `L α(ϕ)⇐⇒
Γ `L α(ci).
Proof. First consider the case in which Γ `L α(ϕ) for every formula α(z)
in which z really occurs. We want to prove that condition 1 is satisfied.
Then consider ci with i < 2 and a formula α(z) in which z really occurs. If
α(z) is not a variable, then α(ci) is a theorem by Fact 6.3. Then consider
the case where α(z) is a variable. Clearly α = z. Also in this case α(ci) is
a theorem. Thus we conclude that condition 1 is satisfied.
Then consider the case where there is at least one formula α(z), in which
z really occurs, such that Γ 0L α(ϕ). From Fact 6.3 it follows that α(z) = z
and, therefore, that Γ 0L ϕ. Together with Fact 6.3 this implies that for
every formula β(z), in which z really occurs, we have that
Γ `L β(ϕ)⇐⇒ β 6= z.
Then consider a constant ci with i > 2 and a formula β(z) in which z
really occurs. From Fact 6.3 and from the definition of  it follows that
Γ `L β(ci) if and only if β 6= z. Thus condition 2 is satisfied. 
Fact 6.5. For every Γ ∈ T hL and ϕ ∈ Γ, there is i ∈ R r {2} such that
〈ϕ, ci〉 ∈ ΩΓ.
Proof. If Γ is the inconsistent theory, then ΩΓ = Fm× Fm and, therefore,
we are done. Then consider the case where Γ is consistent. Suppose
towards a contradiction that 〈ϕ, ci〉 /∈ ΩΓ for every i ∈ Rr {2}. From
Lemma 2.2 it follows that for every i ∈ Rr {2} there is a formula p(z)
such that
Γ `L p(ϕ)⇐⇒ Γ 0L p(ci). (10)
By Fact 6.4 one of the following conditions hold:
1. For every i < 2 and formula α(z) in which z actually occurs: Γ `L
α(ϕ)⇐⇒ Γ `L α(ci).
2. For every i > 2 and formula α(z) in which z actually occurs: Γ `L
α(ϕ)⇐⇒ Γ `L α(ci).
Assume that condition 1 holds (the proof for case 2 is analogous). Then
consider 1 6= i < 2. There is a polynomial function p(z) that satisfies
(10). Thus z actually occurs in p(z). By condition 1, we know that the
main connective of p(z) cannot be . Therefore p(z) = α(z)(j β(z) for
some j ∈ Rr {1, 2} and formulas α and β. Together with Fact 6.2 and
〈ϕ, ci〉 /∈ ΩΓ, this implies that
Γ `L α(ci)(j β(ci).
Since Γ is consistent, there is a homomorphism h : Fm → A such that
h[Γ] ⊆ R× {1}. We have that h(α(ci)(j β(ci)) ∈ R× {1}. But this is to
say that
hα(ci) = 〈j, 0〉 and hβ(ci) = 〈j, 1〉.
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From the definition of (j it follows that α(ϕ) must be a variable yi and
that β(ϕ) must be either a variable or cj (this is because i 6= 1). Since z
actually occurs in α(z)(j β(z) we conclude that α(ci)(j β(ci) = yi (j ci.
Keeping in mind that h(yi (j ci) ∈ R×{1}, we obtain that j = i. Therefore
we conclude that Γ `L yi (i ci. Now, we proved that for every 1 6= i < 2
there is a variable yi such that
Γ `L yi (i ci. (11)
Consider the homomorphism h above. From (11) it follows that h(yi) =
〈i, 0〉 for every i < 2. But this contradicts the fact that there are uncountably
many reals smaller than 2 and different from 1 and only countably many
variables in Fm. 
Fact 6.6. Ω is order-reflecting (and therefore injective) over T hL.
Proof. Consider two theories Γ, Γ′ ∈ T hL such that ΩΓ ⊆ ΩΓ′. Then pick
ϕ ∈ Γ (we can always do this, since L has theorems). By Fact 6.5 there is a
constant ci such that 〈ϕ, ci〉 ∈ ΩΓ ⊆ ΩΓ′. Since ∅ `L ci, by compatibility
we obtain that ϕ ∈ Γ′. Hence ΩΓ ⊆ ΩΓ′ as desired. 
The outcome of the work done in this section can be summarized as
follows:
Theorem 6.7. The injectivity of the Leibniz operator does not transfer in general
from theories to filters over arbitrary algebras.
7. Small truth sets
There is at least another definability condition that fits into the framework
of the Leibniz hierarchy, and that until now was not recognized in the
literature.
Definition 7.1. Let M be a class of matrices and L the logic it defines. Truth
is small in M if the truth set F is the smallest non-empty deductive filter of
L over A, for every 〈A, F〉 ∈ M.
As usual, we say that the truth sets of logic L are small, if truth is small
in Mod∗L. We have the following:
Lemma 7.2.
1. If the truth sets of a logic are (almost) small, then they are implicitly definable
as well.
2. If the truth sets of a logic are (almost parametrically equationally) equationally
definable, then they are (almost) small as well.
Proof. 1. Suppose that truth is almost small in Mod∗L. Then consider two
non-almost trivial reduced models 〈A, F〉 and 〈A, G〉 of L. Since truth
is almost small in Mod∗L, we have that both F and G are the smallest
non-empty deductive filter of L over A. In particular, this means that
F = G.
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2. Suppose that truth is almost parametrically equationally definable
in Mod∗L. Then consider a non-almost trivial reduced model 〈A, F〉 of
L and any G ∈ FiLAr {∅}. We have that ΩAF = IdA ⊆ ΩAG. With
an application of Theorem 3.9 we obtain that F ⊆ G. Since F 6= ∅, we
conclude that F is the smallest non-empty deductive filter of L over A. 
The fact that the notion of smallness is strictly stronger than the one of
implicit definability, when referred the truth sets of a logic, was first proved
by the [32, Example 2] of Raftery.4 Another example of logic whose truth
sets are implicitly definable, but not small, is the 〈, 1〉-fragment of the
local consequence of the modal system S4 [28, Example 3.4]. Moreover, the
fact that the notion of equational definability is strictly stronger than the
one of smallness, when referred to the truth sets of a logic, is proved in
Example 7.5.
The next result shows that the class of logics whose truth sets are small
belongs to the Leibniz hierarchy, in the sense that it is characterized by a
property of the Leibniz operator:
Theorem 7.3. Truth is (almost) small in Mod∗L if and only if ΩA is (almost)
order reflecting over FiLA for every algebra A.
Proof. We begin by the “only if” part. Consider F, G ∈ FiLAr {∅} such
that ΩAF ⊆ ΩAG. Let h : A/ΩAF → A/ΩAG be the natural surjection.
We have that h−1[G/ΩAG] ∈ FiL(A/ΩAF). By the assumption we know
that F/ΩAF is the smallest non-empty deductive filter of L on A/ΩAF.
Since h−1[G/ΩAG] 6= ∅, we conclude that F/ΩAF ⊆ h−1[G/ΩAG]. Then
let a ∈ F. We have that a/ΩAF ⊆ h−1[G/ΩAG] and, therefore, a ∈ G.
Then we turn to check the “if” part. Consider a non-almost trivial
reduced model 〈A, F〉 of L and a filter G ∈ FiLAr {∅}. We have that
ΩAF = 0A ⊆ ΩAG. By the assumption we obtain F ⊆ G. Since F 6= ∅, we
conclude that F is the smallest non-empty deductive filter of L on A. 
Related to the study of the transfer problem, it is natural to ask whether
the order-reflection of the Leibniz operator transfers from theories to filters
over arbitrary algebras. This is not the case in general: the logic L described
in Section 6 is such that Ω : T hL → ConFm is order-reflecting (Fact
6.6), while ΩA : FiLA→ ConA is not injective (and, therefore, not order-
reflecting) in general. Nevertheless, a natural adaptation of the proof of
Theorem 5.6 yields the following result:
4Observe that in the paper [32] the notion of smallness is not considered on his own
right, so that the reader will not find there an explicit statement separating the concept of
smallness from that of implicit definability. What is proved in the quoted [32, Example 2] is
the existence of a logic L such that ΩA : FiLA → ConA is injective, but not necessarily
order-reflecting, for every algebra A. In the light of Theorem 7.3, this is enough to separate
the concept of implicit definability from that of smallness.
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Theorem 7.4. For logics expressed in a countable language the (almost) order-
reflection of the Leibniz operator transfers from theories to filters over arbitrary
algebras.
Proof. We apply Theorem 7.3. Suppose that Ω is order-reflecting over T hL.
This easily implies that L has theorems and, therefore, that its deductive
filters are non-empty. Consider a reduced model 〈A, F〉 of L. We have to
prove that F is the smallest non-empty deductive filter of L over A. Then
consider G ∈ FiLAr {∅} and a ∈ F. We know that G 6= ∅. Thus we can
choose an element b ∈ G. We let C be the subalgebra of A, generated by
{a, b}. Since C is finitely generated, we can apply Lemma 5.5 and extend
it to a countably generated subalgebra B of A such that 〈B, F ∩ B〉 is a
reduced model of L.
Since B is countable, there is a surjective homomorphism h : Fm→ B.
Then let Γ := h−1[F ∩ B] and Γ′ := h−1[G ∩ B]. Notice that F ∩ B and
G ∩ B are non-empty, and hence Γ and Γ′ are non-empty as well. Clearly
Γ, Γ′ ∈ T hL. From Lemma 2.1 we obtain that
ΩΓ = Ωh−1[F ∩ B] = h−1ΩB(F ∩ B) = h−10B = Ker(h).
Moreover, since Ker(h) is compatible with Γ′, we know thatΩΓ = Ker(h) ⊆
ΩΓ′. Hence we can apply the assumption and conclude that Γ ⊆ Γ′. To-
gether with the fact that h is surjective, this implies that
F ∩ B = hh−1[F ∩ B] = h[Γ] ⊆ h[Γ′] = hh−1[G ∩ B] ⊆ G ∩ B.
Therefore we obtain that a ∈ F ∩ B ⊆ G ∩ B ⊆ G. This shows that F ⊆
G. 
Example 7.5 (Small truth sets). We describe a logic L, whose truth sets
are small but not equationally definable. To this end, let L be the logic,
expressed in the language 〈, 1〉 of type 〈1, 0〉, axiomatized by the following
Hilbert-style rules:
∅ ` 1 ∅ ` 1 x ` y.
We will prove that truth is small, but not equationally definable, in Mod∗L.
To this end, let A4 = 〈{a, b, c, 1},, 1〉 be the algebra where  is defined
for every x ∈ A4 as follows:
p =
{
a if p ∈ {1, c}
b otherwise.
Let A3 be the subalgebra of A4 with universe {1, a, b}.
Fact 7.6. Mod∗L is the closure under isomorphism of 〈A4, {1, a}〉, 〈A3, {1, a}〉
and 〈1, {1}〉.
The inclusion from right to left follows from the definition of L. Then
we turn to prove the other inclusion. Consider 〈A, F〉 ∈ Mod∗L. If A is
trivial, then also 〈A, F〉 = 〈1, {1}〉, since L has theorems. The suppose that
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A is non-trivial. The fact that x `L y implies that that characterization
of the Leibniz congruence given in point 1 of Lemma 2.2 can be finitized,
yielding the following result: for every p, q ∈ A
p = q if and only if (p ∈ F ⇔ q ∈ F and p ∈ F ⇔ q ∈ F). (12)
Since ∅ `L 1 and ∅ `L 1, we know that 1,1 ∈ F. The facts that
x `L y and that 〈A, F〉 is non-trivial and reduced, imply that n1 /∈ F
for every n > 2. In particular, this implies that 1 6= 1 and 21 = 31 by
(12). Now let p ∈ F. We have cases: either p ∈ F or p /∈ F. By (12) in
both cases p ∈ {1,1}. Hence F = {1,1}.
If A = {1,1,1}, then 〈A, F〉 ∼= 〈A3, {1, a}〉. Then consider the case
where A 6= {1,1,1}. There is p ∈ Ar {1,1,1}. In particular,
this yields that p /∈ F. By (12) and the fact that p 6= 1, we know that
p ∈ F. Again, since x `L y and A is non-trivial, we obtain that
p /∈ F. Thus from (12) we conclude that p = 1.
If A = {1,1,1, p}, then 〈A, F〉 ∼= 〈A4, {1, a}〉. Suppose the contrary
towards a contradiction. Then there is q ∈ A r {1,1,1, c}. Since
F = {1,1}, we know that q /∈ F. But from (12) it follows that either
q = 1 or q = p, against the assumption.
Fact 7.7. The truth sets of L are small.
This is a direct application of the definition of L to the characterization
of the class Mod∗L given in Fact 7.6.
Fact 7.8. The truth sets of L are not equationally definable.
Observe that the terms in one variable x up to equivalence in V(A4)
are {x,x,x, 1,1}. It is easy to check that x ≈ x is the only equation,
built up with these terms, that is satisfied by the designated elements of
〈A4, {1, a}〉. Since 〈A4, {1, a}〉 is a reduced model of L, we conclude that
truth is not equationally definable in Mod∗L. 
In Figure 1 the reader can find a diagram (where arrows represent
inclusions) that subsume the definability conditions considered so far
in the framework of the Leibniz hierarchy (see [10, 16] for the relevant
definitions). It is worth to remark that all classes in that diagram are
different, as explained in the following technical remark (that the reader
may safely skip, without loosing the sense of the paper).
Remark 7.9. Observe that the fact that the inclusion relations depicted in
Figure 1 are sound follows from Lemma 7.2 and well-known facts about
the Leibniz hierarchy. Moreover, to prove that all the classes in the picture
are different, it would be enough to show that the 6 classes below the one
of logics, whose truth sets are equationally definable, are different.
The fact that the classes of logics whose truth sets are respectively implic-
itly definable, small and equationally definable are different is motivated
at pag. 24. Moreover, in Section 4 some example of logics whose truth
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sets are almost parametrically equationally but not equationally, definable
are described. Now we describe a logic whose truth sets are almost small,
but neither almost parametrically equationally definable nor small. We
already motivated the existence of a logic L whose truth sets are small,
but not equationally definable. Then let L′ be the logic whose theories are
T hL ∪ {∅}. The truth sets of L′ are not small, since L is purely inferential.
Moreover, by Theorem the fact that the truth sets of L are not equationally
definable, that ΩA : FiLA→ ConA is not completely-order reflecting for
some algebra A. Now, observe that FiLA ⊆ FiL′A and that FiLA is a set
of non-empty filters. Thus we conclude that the map ΩA : FiL′A→ ConA
is not almost completely order-reflecting. By Theorem 3.9 we conclude that
the truth sets of L′ are not almost parametrically equationally definable.
Applying a similar argument, it is possible to construct a logic whose truth
sets are almost implicitly definable, but neither almost small nor almost
implicitly definable. 
Appendix
In the forthcoming papers [30, 29] the problem of classifying logics in
the Leibniz hierarchy is studied from a computational point of view. At
the time where these papers were written the extension of the Leibniz
hierarchy presented here was not developed yet. For this reason, we take
the opportunity of mentioning that the proof of [30, Theorem 4.10] yields
the following:
Theorem 7.10. Let K be a level of the Leibniz hierarchy in Figure 1. The problem
of determining whether the logic of a given consistent finite Hilbert calculus in a
finite language belongs to K is undecidable.
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